Then and now – 1998–2025 network enabled capability (NEC) to data centric reality
Robert Wright
Network Enabled Capability as a concept is over 25 years old though the narrative remains fresh and compelling. Over a quarter of a century on, technical progress promises the intelligence and autonomy to rapidly derive operational value from the volume of information gathered. Today's architectural challenge is how best to distribute this intelligence and autonomy across the operating space, delegating it as close to the tactical edge as possible. The UK MoD's Digital Targeting Web (DTW) envisions a homogenous information environment in which platforms, sensors, and shooters exchange mission critical information concisely and at the speed of operational relevance. Can DTW overcome some of the enduring problems of NEC?
Elusive interoperability
Frictionless interoperability has so far proven elusive and has limited the practical realisation of many of the benefits envisaged of NEC. The expansion of multi-domain operations to include cyber and spaced based effects; the continual increase in the number of endpoints - sensor, effector, and shooter; and corresponding rise in data volumes compound the challenge. The limitation of NEC was inherent in the title, Network. While single networks tend to interoperate well, the integration of two or more heterogenous networks, with the inherent technical and contractual differences generally necessitate the need for boundary devices. This tends to impede the flow of information and is especially true when crossing security classifications or trust boundaries.
It's not all about the data
By shifting the emphasis on security away from network infrastructure data-centric security simplifies the necessary architecture - one network for secured data in transit, in use or at rest, irrespective of the sensitivity. This concept is well suited to cloud and distributed environments operating at scale, with obvious attractions. Simplified network architecture is offset somewhat by the need for significantly increased encryption overheads, both in the complexity of the application and the need for synchronisation at scale; and the potential for catastrophic security implications in the event of compromise. Blending DCS with Zero Trust principles increases security, especially across system boundaries but introduces further administrative overheads.
One rule for all?
Applying regulated security controls at the micro (data) level makes it difficult to validate and audit policy compliance by traditional means at the (macro) level. The abundance of related standards complicates the issue. The strict application of standards pertaining to one region or operating sector is likely to impede interoperability with users in other sectors or those operating to differing regulatory standards - with familiar implications for frictionless multi-domain operation unless addressed. An equally important consideration, the move from IT infrastructure security to data governance, requires a conceptual shift, with less emphasis on largely technical control measures to a holistic whole team approach. Acceptance of additional policy overheads and an openness to new ways of working will be essential to realising the full potential of the DTW.
Value vs volume
Data without context is just that - data, it has limited value without analysis. A criticism levelled at NEC was the risk of operator overload when presented with overwhelming volumes of data of varying quality. Thankfully, the tools for data analytics and machine learning have improved over the last 2 decades in line with the significant increase in data volumes, though much of the analysis is currently concentrated in higher formations or at higher security classifications. The challenge for DTW remains how best to delegate and distribute autonomous analytics appropriately close to the source of data ingestion, both to enable rapid triage, through real-time prioritisation by value; and for resilience, to enable local operations to continue if wider connectivity is denied.
Brown field working
The transition to a fully DCS-native environment will take time. Even when all newly commissioned systems are DCS compliant there will a collection of legacy Network -Centric Security (NCS) systems remaining in-service necessitating the need for a hybrid DCS-NCS working regime for the foreseeable future. Hybrid working must be as frictionless as possible for DTW to be fully effective.
Summary
DTW has the potential to realise and surpass the benefits envisaged by NEC. While DTW is unlikely to be realised without DCS, it alone will not be sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes. Success will require the coherent application of policy and regulation, concerted cultural change, and consistent programmatic discipline within MoD and across supporting industry.